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A study of habit and other unconscious backgrounds 
of action shows how shapes of spiritual life in 
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit each imply 
correlative senses of lived time.  The very form of 
time thus gives spirit a sensuous encounter with its 
own concept.  The point that conceptual content is 
manifest in the sensuous form of time is key to an 
interpretation of Hegel’s infamous and puzzling 
remarks about time and the concept in “Absolute 
Knowing.”  The article also shows how Hegel’s 
Phenomenology connects with current discussions of 
lived time, habit, and, via discussion of Wallace’s 
Infinite Jest, addiction.  
 
We are mortal, our days are numbered.  But 
our days are not to be numbered as we 
would number a growing pile of objects, as 
if each day is a discrete addendum to an 
already determined record.  We experience 
our lives as more or less happy, more or less 
meaningful, as made up of more or less 
successful actions, and this “more or less” is 
just one indication that we experience our 
lives as involving an overall weave of time.1  
Days do not pile up, rather our lifetime as a 
whole unfolds new meanings in the 
succession of works and days.  Time as we 
experience it is lived time, a term I use to 
capture the sense of time elucidated by 
existential phenomenologists in this century, 
most prominently Heidegger and Merleau-
Ponty, a time in which—to roughly note 
features relevant to what follows—past, 
present, and future are not directions along 
an ordered continuum of discrete time-
points, but interwoven aspects of an ecstatic 
structuring of experience, which structuring 
is integral with one’s situated existence.2  A 
sense of lived time belongs to the sense of 
one’s life as a life well or badly lived. This 
is why questions about time continually 
arise as a matter of course in life and 
philosophy.3
Even before we raise explicit questions 
about time, the attempt to live life well 
throws us into encounters with it.  This is 
especially true in the experience of problems 
with habit.  One tries to live one’s life well, 
one tries to head toward one’s own future, 
yet one’s life unfolds from habits that 
seemingly ‘run’ one from one’s past—past 
life implies itself in the fabric of the present 
and thus extrudes a shell around one’s 
future.  In the case of an unshakeable habit, 
an addiction, habit is no mere shell, it is a 
prison.  The matter of this shell or prison, 
which flares into prominence in the attempt 
to live well, is time.   
But habit is not merely a shell, prison 
or problem, for the shell embeds actions that 
we no longer have to explicitly engage, thus 
granting a new situational background and 
correlative identity that supports ever more 
complex activity.  One of the crucial insights 
of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit is that 
general backgrounds of this sort are vital to 
self-conscious action.  Hegel argues that 
self-conscious life issues into the project of 
reason, but reason must configure itself as a 
practical activity, as a life of reason, rather 
than a merely theoretical endeavour, and the 
life of reason presupposes a living situation 
that cannot be constituted by any purely 
rational process.4  Each shape of rational 
and thence spiritual activity presumes a 
background that is already there, a 
background that is not constituted by 
rationality or spirit at the present moment, 
but nonetheless possesses its own rationality 
or spirituality.   
In what follows I study the 
backgrounds of different shapes of spirit as 
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 forms of habit.  This illuminates senses of 
lived time proper to each shape of spirit, as 
well as illuminating habit and its temporality 
in general, thus leading to important results 
about time in Hegel’s Phenomenology.  As 
Joseph Flay shows, time is in fact crucial 
throughout the Phenomenology, since the 
first chapter, “Sense Certainty,” embeds all 
knowing and doing in a temporal matrix.  
But as Flay also points out, Hegel does not 
say very much directly about time between 
the chapters on consciousness and the last 
chapter of the book, so Flay sets out to 
reconstruct what would be said about time in 
the intervening chapters, beginning from 
epistemological considerations.5  By 
attending to habit and action, I give a 
reconstruction that instead focuses on the 
relation between living spiritual experience 
and time.  This has the advantage of drawing 
Hegel into the discussion of lived time.  
More important, it shows how spiritual life 
sediments itself into time, or, to put it 
another way, how issues vital to various 
shapes of spiritual life can be intuitively 
encountered in the form of time.  The very 
form of time can give us an intuitive 
encounter with the concept of spirit, and 
understanding this is key to interpreting 
Hegel’s notoriously puzzling claims about 
time and its “annullment” in the chapter on 
absolute knowing.   
Given that habit is crucial to my 
approach, I begin in section one with a 
discussion of habit and its role in Hegel’s 
Phenomenology, taking up John Russon’s 
and John McCumber’s analyses of habit in 
Hegel, and Joseph Flay’s discussion of time.  
In section two, I draw on an account of 
addiction in David Foster Wallace’s novel 
Infinite Jest in order to illustrate Hegel’s 
point that pure reason fails as a guide of 
human life.  When it comes time to change 
actions against the weight of habit, 
something more than reason, a life of ritual 
that plunges us into an encounter with time, 
is needed.  In section three, the point from 
Infinite Jest helps me elucidate the different 
senses of time that develop through the three 
main shapes of spirit that Hegel analyzes in 
chapter VI, namely the ethical order, culture 
and morality.  I return to Infinite Jest at the 
end of section two to elucidate the sense of 
time belonging to religion.  In section four 
my study of the relation between spiritual 
life and senses of time lets me show what 
Hegel means when he calls time the intuited 
concept and “the concept itself that is there.”  
This leads to an interpretation of his claim 
that in absolute knowing the time-form is 
annulled.  I argue that lived time does not 
vanish in absolute knowing, rather the sense 
of lived time is shown to emerge from 
spirit’s self-conceptual life, from its 
comprehension of its conceptual situation 
and history, rather than from a formal 
ordering of time.   
I: From Hegel’s Dialectic of Self-
Consciousness, to Habit as the Unself-
Conscious Background of Action 
The dialectic of the Phenomenology can be 
described as operating in the tension 
between self-conscious claims about 
experience and experience itself.  The 
dialectic develops through an analytical 
focus on the self-conscious side of this 
tension, but the focus on the self-conscious 
side precisely leads to a claim about 
experience, namely about what is already 
requisite to experience itself if self-
consciousness is ever to make its claims.  
This has two crucial implications.  First, we 
should not be surprised if time seems to 
disappear from the foreground of discussion 
in the Phenomenology, since the book will 
focus on time only as it matters to the self-
conscious claims being analyzed.  Second, 
in being absent from the foreground, time 
has been absorbed into the background, and 
can be encountered in other ways, for 
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 example, in the form of habit and its 
temporality.  These two points need a bit 
more explanation, which will also show how 
a study of shapes of habit in the 
Phenomenology can help reconstruct senses 
of time that are not explicitly discussed by 
it.    
In the tension between self-
consciousness and experience itself (to 
continue with the above description of the 
Phenomenology’s dialectic, which 
description is geared to the concern of this 
paper, rather than being comprehensive or 
definitive), experience initially appears as 
opposed to self-consciousness: the flux of 
sense-certainty is just given, self-
consciousness has no hand in it, self-
consciousness just makes claims about it, 
the given is not conscious.  Hegel’s 
dialectical analysis of conscious experience, 
however, shows that the given already 
appears as having the sort of universal 
structures proper to consciousness, that 
consciousness has a hand in synthesizing 
perceptual activity, that experience is driven 
by a force mirroring that of the 
understanding, that in fact the sense of the 
given is inseparable from our living 
interests, from our self-conscious desire.6  
Rather than saying the given has nothing to 
do with consciousness, it would be better to 
say that the given is ‘unself-conscious,’ 
since it in fact emerges relative to our self-
conscious activity.   
Hegel’s dialectic focuses on the 
forward movement that arises from 
pressures inherent in making self-conscious 
claims about experience.  The philosopher 
makes a claim about what experience is, but 
what is given belies the claim, so the claim 
must be revised.  To the philosopher self-
consciously claiming that truth is what is 
sensuously given, time appears as an unself-
consciously given series of nows, but Hegel 
shows that this flow of nows is in fact 
reflective of self-consciousness.  What is 
given as an unself-conscious element of 
experience is in fact reflective of self-
consciousness.  So what plays the role of the 
unself-conscious is relative to our 
reflections.  Hegel’s Phenomenology 
primarily focuses on the reflective claims of 
self-conscious spiritual life, and relative to 
this, time often appears as an unmentioned, 
unself-conscious background; but Hegel’s 
dialect also shows that this unself-conscious 
background has already absorbed self-
conscious elements.  Time, when it recedes 
as a focus of self-conscious reflection, does 
not disappear, it is incorporated into the 
unself-conscious background against which 
self-consciousness figures its claims, so we 
can learn something about time by studying 
this background.7   
In his article “Time in Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit,” Joseph Flay 
argues that Hegel’s analysis of sense-
certainty, perception and understanding 
show that: 
Time is something we constitute in the 
sense that the knowledge relation is in 
part a function of the way in which we 
approach what-is, of the way in which we 
insert ourselves into the world with one 
or another intention in the form of desire.  
Time is something which arises in what 
are truly transactions between a knower 
and something known or knowable.  
(264) 
From the point of view I have been 
developing, this is the claim that time 
belongs to the unself-conscious background 
of experience in virtue of the way that self-
conscious desire configures itself.  Time is 
not a given, rather it, or more properly its 
sense, how we experience time, is an unself-
conscious counterpart of the way we insert 
ourselves in the world. 
Habit, if conceived in an expansive 
way, is a proper designation for the unself-
conscious background of self-conscious 
experience.  This concept and approach to 
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 habit is supported by John Russon’s and 
John McCumber’s studies of habit and its 
role in Hegel’s philosophy. 
In The Self and its Body in Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit, John Russon 
presents a study of the Phenomenology that 
articulates its dialectical argument in terms 
of an interrelation of phusis, hexis and logos.  
In the context of his book, Russon’s study of 
hexis (which he translates as “habit”) 
suggests the following.  To experience 
phusis is to experience a sphere that has its 
own drive prior to our participation in it, a 
sphere in-itself opposed to consciousness.  A 
hexis is experienced as something that 
verges toward appearing just as fixed, alien 
and opposed to consciousness as phusis.  
But it is intrinsic to hexis that we sometimes 
experience ourselves as participant in it.  
When we are subject to our own habit, it 
almost seems like a force of nature, but in 
realizing that we participate in changing and 
acquiring our habit, habit appears as a force 
of our own nature.  A hexis, in other words, 
is an unconscious background of experience, 
but, as Russon puts it, a hexis makes itself 
unconscious and inconspicuous; a hexis is 
not in-itself unconscious (as is phusis), but 
has made itself be so.8  When we experience 
that we have contributed to the making of 
hexis and can change it through self-
conscious behaviour, we encounter a hexis 
as partly participant in a self-conscious 
logos, the habit appears as an expression of 
self-conscious meaning (logos).  In 
reflecting on one’s habitual actions, one 
becomes ever more self-conscious of those 
actions as not merely stemming from a habit 
fixed like a force of nature, but as 
expressions of choices that one has made.  A 
self-conscious meaning is exposed within 
one’s habit, a meaning that was latent, but 
not apparent, in the process of habituation.  
Acquiring latent meaning in this way is 
quite important.  We are taught to do the 
right thing before we are self-conscious of 
its rightness or capable of self-consciously 
arriving at our own conclusions about the 
right thing to do.  
Habit is thus conceived as a mediating 
term with a specific functional role in 
Hegel’s dialectic.  Habit designates 
whatever functions as a requisite 
background that mediates between 
unconscious nature and self-conscious 
spiritual life.  It is what I have been calling 
unself-conscious.  And here it is important 
to remember that “unself-conscious” is a 
relative term.  Russon emphasises that habit 
is a relative term, that habit becomes an ever 
more complex term of experience, and that 
the absorption of ever more complexity into 
habit is what enables ever more complex 
self-conscious activity.9  Habit in this sense, 
and given its temporal character, would be 
the place to look for missing senses of time 
in the Phenomenology, granted that time is 
‘missing’ because it has been absorbed into 
the unself-conscious background of 
experience, rather than having vanished 
altogether.  And habit in this sense is not to 
be confused with a particular faculty, but 
with a whole range of phenomena, since 
habit’s essential determination is its 
functional role as a midway point between 
something purely natural and something 
purely conceptual, a role that enables the 
whole tension between self-consciousness 
and its other in the first place.  Habit so 
conceived is broad in scope, and quite 
important to the development traced by the 
Phenomenology.  For example, the 
representations and rituals of religion, the 
unself-conscious practices of everyday life, 
and so on, would count as forms of habit, 
and as crucial in enabling the development 
traced by the phenomenology.10  
John McCumber’s analysis likewise 
emphasizes that habit should be conceived 
as a midway point between the natural and 
the spiritual, given Hegel’s direct remarks 
on habit in the Philosophy of Mind, and that 
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 this conception gives something akin to 
habit an expansive role in important 
transitions in Hegel’s philosophy.  Indeed, in 
the Philosophy of Mind, Hegel writes that 
“The form of habit applies to all kinds and 
grades of mental action” and that “Habit on 
an ampler scale, and carried out in the 
strictly intellectual range, is recollection and 
memory.”11  McCumber’s analysis shows 
how habit, in the first and more ordinary 
instance (for example, habituation to cold 
weather), is crucial for Hegel since it 
enables a sense of a “me” that persists 
precisely in having habits that institute 
generalized behaviours over and above 
immediate feelings.  In being habituated, I 
am no longer wholly absorbed by the 
sensation of cold, I am a cold-dweller, I am 
no longer possessed by cold as a natural 
phenomenon, I have my own nature over 
against this natural phenomenon.12  This is 
the sense in which habit operates as a shell, 
rooted in the past, that gives a sense of 
identity. 
The sort of self-persisting, self-
identifying “I” whose ‘own nature’ is 
enabled by habit in this narrower sense is, I 
would argue, precisely what we find refined 
in the other grades of habit that Hegel 
mentions.  For example, a self that recollects 
is a self whose ‘own nature’ is such that it 
has the sophistication to interpret a historical 
“me” over against the storm of present 
psychological activity, its habitual 
interpretative activity distinguishes a present 
self from its past, rather than being sunk in 
an eternal present.  This sort of self would 
already have to have a basis for recollection, 
and that basis could not itself be recollected, 
it must have already been unself-conscious.  
In other words, recollection depends on 
habit, broadly conceived.  And it is this sort 
of self-conscious recollecting life (self-
conscious because set over against its own 
self, its history, its claims, its reflections) 
that is the precise concern of the 
Phenomenology.  Therefore habit as what 
enables such a life is also a concern of the 
Phenomenology, a point that McCumber 
secures in more detail in his article (and by a 
different route than the one I take here). 
If habit is the unself-conscious 
background vitally integral to self-conscious 
life, to spirit, then it precisely falls into the 
background of Hegel’s phenomenology of 
spirit, given its emphasis on the self-
conscious steps forward.  What follows will 
attend to habit formations as the background 
for actions belonging to shapes of spirit, and 
thence to senses of time belonging to those 
shapes. 
II: The Temporality of Habit and the Time 
of Reason 
To experience oneself as acting out of habit 
is to find oneself doing something without 
experiencing oneself as having explicitly 
chosen how to do it, or even having chosen 
to do it at all.  I did not choose to move in 
such and such a way, to react in this way in 
this situation, I did so out of habit.  
Sometimes even my actions in the moral 
sphere appear to be rooted in habit: I find 
myself set in a course of action without 
having deliberated about it.  Habit as an 
integral unself-conscious background of 
action turns the experience of action into a 
problem: I did not do the habitual act (since 
it stems from the unself-conscious 
background that is habit), yet in another 
sense I did (since I am participant in habit, it 
is my seemingly self-conscious activity that 
has led to habit, and I could have had 
another habit).   
This problematic aspect is especially 
apparent in cases of bad habit, habits that 
lead us into action inappropriate to the 
present.  But it is also the case in good habit: 
it is precisely because one does not have to 
‘do’ what is accomplished by habit that 
good habits do their good, that they allow 
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 one to compress otherwise complex 
judgements into simple habitual behaviour, 
and that they grant one the ability to behave 
rightly in a situation that one cannot 
negotiate through explicit reflection (as 
when one learns good habits from others 
without yet comprehending what is behind 
them).  There is a complexity of good and 
bad when it comes to habit: aren’t all habits 
bad so far as they are merely habitual rather 
than responsible to their context, yet don’t 
we mortals nonetheless need habit?  I shall 
have to leave this complexity implicit in 
what follows, and merely note that I tend to 
focus on examples of bad habit, simply for 
the reason that bad habit confronts us with 
what is at stake, temporally and otherwise, 
in habit, whereas good habit precisely 
becomes a transparent background of self-
conscious life.13     
One’s experience of this problem 
about habit—that I did and did not do the 
habitual act—has a temporal sense to it.  
The act done from habit appears as already 
done before I made it happen; I experience it 
as not truly acting in the present, as being 
inappropriate to the present, since it is 
rooted in a past presumption.  The habitual 
action is therefore not void as act, rather its 
act-character recedes into the past.  Habits 
confront one with past actions, they confront 
us with who one has been.  But they also 
throw one toward the future, since the 
experience of the inappropriateness of the 
act, say in a spontaneous feeling of shame 
around a habit, confronts one with who one 
desires to be.  In cases where one 
experiences a habitual action as changeable, 
this linkage between past, present and future 
is much more thematic: one not only 
encounters a past that has erupted in habit, 
but encounters that past as reworkable in the 
future.  Habit’s problematization of the 
sense of act turns into an experience of the 
sense of time in which one could overcome 
this problem by changing one’s habit and 
action.  When I feel shame at my action, the 
shame implicates me not just in this present 
action but in a lifetime that has not yet 
overcome shameful habits, and in which 
such habits could be overcome.   
When one experiences one’s action as 
depending on habit as an unself-conscious 
background of action, one can experience 
one’s action as arising in the sort of lived 
time that makes sense of the relation 
between action and habit.  And a habitual 
background seems to be intrinsic to action in 
general.  This point is apparent in claims as 
diverse as Aristotle’s about the inevitable 
role of habit in action, Merleau-Ponty’s 
about the situatedness and structure of 
activity, Heidegger’s about the world-hood 
of the world being a totality of reference, 
and the developmental psychologist’s and 
everyday realizations that our current 
actions depend on a background of skills, 
dispositions and habits that develop through 
one’s life.  So concrete action arises in a 
habit-action couple that can throw one into 
an encounter with lived time in which one’s 
present belongs to a past and future that are 
interwoven through one’s present.   
One’s action, then, if one attends to it, 
does not appear as strictly local to one’s 
present self, but as dispersed into one’s 
history of action in the world.  A temporality 
essential to life thus appears within 
experiences of action, and this temporality 
seems to be enclosed within one’s own 
lifetime.  For example, to experience shame 
at a habit is, after all, to have an encounter 
with the temporality of one’s own life in a 
way that seems impossible for anyone else.  
But at the same time an alienating otherness 
looms within such experiences: one’s own 
life seems alien to oneself when habit comes 
up from one’s past and directs one away 
from a desired future, when one’s own habit 
presents an obstacle to one’s own life.  In 
action, one is in a tension with one’s own 
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 habit, and the demand of action would seem 
to be that one act on that habit, to change it.   
This line of analysis can be tied to the 
Phenomenology in the following way.  
Hegel’s analysis of desire and life shows 
that time is an issue intrinsic to life.14   But 
the analysis of self-conscious desire as 
entailing recognition shows that the time in 
question is not merely natural.  What self-
consciousness wants recognized—what is 
staked in the struggle to the death—is 
something precisely not present in a moment 
of natural life, but in an overall lifetime 
freely and self-consciously lived.15  One’s 
lifetime is in this sense an inherent issue in 
the unself-conscious background of self-
consciousness.  But the inherence of this 
time in the unself-conscious background of 
self-consciousness, which is manifest in the 
struggle to the death, precisely arises from 
the contradiction that self-consciousness is a 
freedom, a negative power, that is above and 
beyond merely natural life, yet is 
nonetheless manifest nowhere else than in 
life.  This contradiction is realised in the 
experience of stoicism and scepticism, and 
is pushed to its limit by the unhappy 
consciousness which, in its living world, 
cannot find an adequate relation to an other 
that would reflect its interior freedom.16  
When unhappy consciousness tries to locate 
its “unchangeable” other within the 
sensuous world it necessarily follows that 
“in time it [the unchangeable] has vanished, 
and that in space it had a remote 
existence.”17  The unhappiness of 
consciousness unfolds in the time in which 
consciousness loses that which would 
confirm it.  The resolution of this 
unhappiness begins with reason, which 
reconciles the freedom of self-consciousness 
with life in the claim that it is certain of all 
reality18, that the account of everything, 
including time, is to be found in the process 
of self-conscious life itself, in the life of 
reason, not in an unchangeable other.19  
Reason is thus obliged to give a rational 
specification of what belongs to a lifetime 
freely and self-consciously lived, the sort of 
life exemplified in the life of reason.  So the 
life of reason is a life whose task it is to 
reconcile the unself-conscious background 
of action (whether it be manifest in the 
unhappiness of consciousness, or in the 
more immediate experience of the problem 
of habit discussed above) with self-
consciousness.  The unself-conscious 
background must become self-conscious if 
our actions are truly to give rational sense to 
our lives.20  
Intrinsic to action is a coupling with 
habit, but the demand intrinsic to this 
coupling is that one be able to act on habit 
itself, that one be able to change habits.  
From the point of view of Hegel’s claims 
about reason, the ability to change habit qua 
the background of action would be crucial to 
a life of reason which takes as its sigil its 
certainty that it is all reality.  But there is a 
problem with changing habits, with bringing 
the background of action into the 
foreground, and this problem will show that 
reason is insufficient to its task, and that 
changing habit requires a sense of time 
different than that native to reason—and that 
one cannot deal with the problem of habit 
entirely on one’s own.   
Let me illustrate this with an example 
of a pathological, hard to change habit, 
namely an addiction.  The example is from 
David Foster Wallace’s novel Infinite Jest, 
which (among other things) describes a 
multiplicity of habitual dependencies that 
inform North American life.  Hegel’s 
Phenomenology often articulates its dialectic 
through discussion of central works of 
literature, for example, Antigone, Hamlet, 
Rameau’s Nephew, Faust, and if Hegel’s 
Phenomenology demands that we constantly 
rework it for ourselves, then Infinite Jest 
seems a fitting work of literature through 
which to do so.  Hamlet is here refigured as 
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 the young tennis star Hal Incandenza, whose 
problem is not so much being a prince in 
face of his father’s murder and a rotten state, 
but figuring himself out without succumbing 
to the narcotics hawked by his Rosencrantz 
and Guildenstern like chums, or to other 
dependencies.  To use or not to use is the 
question, and that is the question posed to 
just about every character in the book: how 
to make sense of secular life in face of the 
habitual dependencies integral to that very 
project.  Below, I focus on Don Gately, a 
small time thief and addict, whose path 
crosses Hal’s in various ways, and who ends 
up being more or less crucified by the end of 
the book.  In the world of Infinite Jest, 
entertainment and addiction are a pervasive 
and inherent background of secular life, and 
the way out seems to be through what 
amounts to religious community, as is 
shown below.  The novel, then, has the 
advantage of tracing habit and dependency 
as an inherent background of the secular, 
individualized life-world of North America, 
while showing how religion and community 
in the sense identified by Hegel are in fact 
still crucial to secular life, despite the claims 
of the secular world.  This also helps bring 
Hegel into a broader discussion of lived 
time.   
Don Gately is successfully shaking his 
habit by participating in A.A. (Alcoholics 
Anonymous) meetings: 
About four months into his Ennet House 
residency, the agonizing desire to ingest 
synthetic narcotics had been mysteriously 
magically removed from Don Gately….  
They said to get creakily down on his 
mammoth knees in the A.M. every day 
and ask God As He Understood Him to 
remove the agonizing desire, and to hit 
the old knees again at night before sack 
and thank this God-ish figure for the 
Substanceless day just ended, if he got 
through it.  He didn’t have any God- or 
J.C.-background, and the knee-stuff 
seemed like the limpest kind of dickless 
pap, and he felt like a true hypocrite just 
going through the knee-motions that he 
went through faithfully every A.M. and 
P.M., without fail, motivated by a desire 
to get loaded so horrible that he often 
found himself humbly praying for his 
head to just finally explode already and 
get it over with.  Pat had said it didn’t 
matter at this point what he thought or 
believed or even said.  All that mattered 
was what he did.  If he did the right 
things, and kept doing them for long 
enough, what Gately thought and 
believed would magically change.  Even 
what he said.21
Gately cannot figure out how A.A. works.  
He gives himself over to the slogans, 
vocabulary and rituals of A.A.  (“One day at 
a time,” etc.), and prays to a God who never 
appears and that he does not believe in: 
“when he tries to achieve a Big-Picture 
spiritual understanding of a God as he can 
understand Him, he feels Nothing—not 
nothing but Nothing, an edgeless blankness 
that somehow feels worse than the sort of 
unconsidered atheism he Came In with.”22  
He cannot understand how these rituals, 
which at every repetition remind him of the 
full weight of his habit, have ‘added up’ to 
relief from his addiction.  He cannot 
understand how repeatedly doing things that 
have no rationally discernible direct purpose 
in fighting off his addiction can magically 
change him.  How can ritual foreground 
action transform a habit that otherwise 
seems like an unmoveable, unshakeable 
background of his life? 
Gately is living an extreme version of 
a problem intrinsic to habit formation and 
change, one which Aristotle points out in the 
Nicomachean Ethics.23  No one action  
establishes a habit.  Although habits run us 
from our past, we cannot directly act in the 
present to change our future habits.  To 
change a habit, we have to repeatedly act as 
8 
 if from habit, and wait until the habit-to-be 
actually becomes a fixed part of our 
behaviour.  Wanting to change a habit, then, 
is inherently paradoxical: the act of change 
can never be directly initiated in the present, 
and there is a sense in which it is not an act, 
since we do not directly affect the change.  
If one does not comprehend this paradoxical 
structure, then the attempt to change a habit 
fails to appear to be an act, since it does not 
exhibit a straightforward rational structure 
of action, in which some decision on our 
part is comprehensible as leading to some 
decisive change in our world.  To experience 
an attempted change of habit, then, without 
comprehension of its structure, is to 
experience one’s choosing as dissipating 
into a future not yet comprehended by one’s 
present, it is to throw oneself into an endless 
repetition of a ritual that seemingly can 
never yield change and is thus to immerse 
oneself in an almost messianic future that is 
integral to oneself yet remote.  It is to throw 
one’s choice toward a promise that appears 
impossible to fulfil, and is thus to be put in 
contact with a beyond that is to fulfil this 
promise.  Gately does not believe in this 
beyond.  So he cannot figure out why just 
doing the right thing for long enough can 
change his life: “He couldn’t for the 
goddamn life of him understand how this 
thing worked, this thing that was working.  
It drove him bats.”24  
Gately’s problem is that he is trying to 
make sense of his conversion away from 
narcotics through the attitude of reason, 
which, qua being certain that it is all reality, 
claims that action is rationally 
comprehensible down to its last detail 
without reference to something beyond 
reason.  Gately is aware of this tension 
between reason and his conversion.  In his 
opinion, Geoffrey Day’s problem stems 
from his intellectual pretensions: “It’s the 
newcomers with some education that are the 
worst, according to Gene M.  They identify 
their whole selves with their head, and the 
Disease makes its command headquarters in 
the head.” (272)25  Gately, however, doesn’t 
identify himself with the head or reject 
A.A.’s prescriptions as irrational, as does 
Day (a bit too secular, Day); Gately takes up 
A.A.’s rituals and thus moves beyond 
reason’s claim that it can secure all action to 
the last detail.26  
The attitude of reason would be 
adequate to grasping what happens when 
these rituals work only if action and ritual 
could be grasped as a sequence of events in 
the time frame of a rationally orderable 
cosmos, that is, within a temporality 
antithetical to lived time.  But as Hegel 
shows in his study of reason, reason cannot 
be a mere observing bystander that locates 
its action within frameworks that it 
constitutes.  Science claims to observe life 
and explain it from a rational perspective; 
anything that cannot be explained by reason 
is beyond reason.  But the perspective of 
rational observation in fact builds itself in a 
time that is beyond that of reason.  For 
example, rational observation ultimately 
leads scientists to explain nature as an 
autonomous realm that unfolds in a 
cosmological time; but to be a scientist is 
not merely to observe an autonomous nature 
from a scientific perspective, it is to 
communicate one’s results to a community 
of scientists and is therefore to participate in 
the lifetime in which scientists build 
communities of reason.  This means that 
scientists cannot reduce their actions to 
sequences in cosmological time, the activity 
of science is beyond the purely rational 
framework established by science.  
Rationality wants to constitute a rational 
sense for action, but in fact the sense that 
rationality foregrounds depends on a 
background whose constitution is extra-
rational (not irrational!), a background that 
arises in a time beyond that of rational 
analysis.27  
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 From Gately’s experience, then, we 
learn something about senses of time active 
in habit-action.  On the one hand, the 
rational attitude tries to make sense of action 
by articulating it in a time of succession that 
would be graspable by a rational 
consciousness, on the other hand, Gately 
experiences his change of habit and action 
as unfolding in a time that is beyond his 
grasp as a singular rational consciousness.  
When will his actions result in a change of 
habit? He doesn’t know.  How do actions 
lead to change in the series of A.M.s and 
P.M.s, how do these moments relate to one 
another temporally? He doesn’t know.  He 
wants an ordering across activities in time 
that makes rational sense, but instead he 
experiences his change as unfolding in a 
time that is somewhat opaque, in a time 
where things will eventually happen if he 
faithfully adheres to the way that others 
have done things.  This is the experience 
that changing our own action is the work of 
a lifetime, that change of action is not local 
to the here and now.  Changing a habit—and 
thence ultimately acting in a way that is of 
our own choosing—requires a sense of time 
other than the one supplied by a purely 
rational world view.  If rationality is a type 
of self-conscious activity, and if this activity 
requires a background of self-conscious 
communal life that is irreducible to pure 
reason—which is Hegel’s point in his 
analysis of reason—then the sense of time 
claimed by pure reason is insufficient to 
making sense of rational activity.  (At this 
point it would be easy to object that this is 
not a problem about a failure of reason, it is 
a problem about Gately’s failure to be 
rational.  If only he would act like a rational 
agent instead of messing up his life with 
narcotics and theft, then he wouldn’t be in 
this mess, and the above points about time 
and action would be moot.  But this misses 
the point that if we are interested in human 
experience, then it is in fact the case that we 
get into the sorts of problems that Gately 
experiences, that a purely rational stance 
towards one’s life fails to respond to the 
problems intrinsic to human life.  We are not 
beings who fail to live up to a standard of 
pure reason, we are beings whose life is 
something beyond the ambit of pure reason, 
and in my understanding Hegel’s chapter on 
“Reason” is an argument for this point, as is 
his analysis of self-consciousness in terms of 
desire.28)  Hegel’s analysis of reason implies 
that a sense of time beyond a rationally 
ordered time series is requisite to life.29   
But there is something more here.  
Gately realizes that changing his habit is not 
the work of his individual lifetime, but a 
work that requires participation in A.A.  His 
involvement with A.A. is fundamental to the 
“magic” that makes this thing work, “this 
thing that was working.”30  The sense of 
time requisite to life is a sense of a time that 
arises through participation in a community.   
We can arrive at a better sense of the 
role of community in the attempt to change 
habit (and thereby secure a rational sense of 
action) by moving beyond a discussion of 
Hegel’s criticism of reason to tracking a 
series of senses of time that emerge via 
Hegel’s discussion of spirit.  The following 
section broadly steps through Hegel’s 
discussion of the main shapes of spirit 
studied in chapter six of the 
Phenomenology, namely ethical substance, 
culture and morality.  It shows how the 
unself-conscious background integral to 
each of these shapes (as it would be manifest 
if we think about how one changes and 
makes sense of one’s action within each 
shape) implies a particular sense of time.  
And it shows how tensions in this complex 
of changing action and senses of time 
demand further shapes of spiritual life.  The 
strategy is to develop a temporal inflection 
within the dialectic that Hegel presents in 
the Phenomenology; direct justification for 
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 claims made about the Phenomenology is 
given in the notes.  
III: The Time of Spirit 
My central point about ethical substance is 
that making sense of one’s action in ethical 
substance implies a sense of a time that goes 
back into one’s ethos.   
Reason would claim that rational 
action can be made sense of in a time 
reducible to rational analysis.  But Hegel’s 
analysis of rational action shows that such 
action in fact depends on what Hegel calls a 
substance, a community of people who are 
already bound together by something that 
they themselves have not formulated, by a 
bond that precedes the time in which the 
community sets out to find ways of acting 
together rationally; such a bond is a 
condition of seeking ways of acting together 
rationally.  To do science you need a 
rational, scientific community, but to have a 
rational community arise you already need a 
bond far more fundamental than anything 
specified by rationality itself.  
The form of spiritual life in which this 
bond is most prominent is ethical substance, 
that is, the life of a people who define 
themselves in terms of a bond fixed long ago 
in a founding act of ancestors or gods, in a 
tradition that percolates down to the present 
in the form of a fixed body of practices and 
laws, an ethos.31  For Hegel, the Greeks are 
exemplary of such a people.  
The shift from rationality to ethical 
substance entails a claim about senses of 
time.  When I act as an ethical agent, 
defining my action in terms of a tradition 
that has been founded long before me, I 
cannot fully constitute the sense of my act 
on my own, the intention that my act 
manifests and my success in manifesting 
that intention depend on the ethos from 
which I set out to act.  (This, for example, is 
why, according to Collingwood, we write 
history, or tell myths.32)  So my action does 
not make sense as issuing from my own here 
and now, but as issuing from a past 
belonging to my ethos and as moving 
toward a future that will again be shared by 
my ethos.  My action takes place in a time 
where it has already been determined how 
one thing leads to another, a time in which 
my action works to its fullest if action like it 
has already worked.  As Hegel puts it, 
through the words of Sophocles' Antigone, 
the laws of ethical action “are not of 
yesterday or today, they are everlasting.”33   
That one’s sense of time must go back 
into the time of one’s ethos, while one acts 
in one’s present, points to a problem about 
the relation between individual and ethos, 
which is cognate to a central problem 
worked out by Hegel in the chapter on spirit.  
Against reason’s claim that it can constitute 
the sense of time requisite to action, action, 
in virtue of its unself-conscious background, 
depends on a time whose sense one does not 
constitute on one’s own.  Gately cannot 
make sense of how he is truly participant in 
the time of his change, even though that 
change is central to his lifetime.  With 
ethical substance, we have moved from a 
cosmological sense of time, the rational 
sense of which would be constituted in 
abstraction from life, to a time whose sense 
arises within life—but within the life of an 
ethos that is in tension with the individual.   
Consider the case of Antigone, as 
analyzed by Hegel.34  Antigone experiences 
the demand of action as going back into a 
past that claims to be the past of all Greeks, 
but then experiences that this past fails in its 
claim to be the past that rules this present.  
The laws of the Gods fail to hold sway here 
and now.  In terms of time, the lesson of 
Antigone’s attempt to act within the ethical 
order is that the past that one claims as the 
common, unself-conscious background of 
one’s action cannot actually have been given 
as a simple past over and done with, for 
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 example, in a past granted by the Gods.  If 
the past from which one acts is to be 
adequate to the present of which it is the 
past, and to one’s future, then the past 
cannot be over and done with, it must be a 
self-conscious labour of one’s here and now.  
Unlike a rational agent, an ethical agent 
experiences her past as something vital to 
her present, but on the other hand, for an 
ethical agent this past is beyond rational 
comprehension, a time way back when, a 
time when Titans roamed the earth and 
heroes could pick up huge boulders, etc.  It 
is a time severed from the present by 
fundamental differences between then and 
now.  If the past is severed from the present, 
then the sense that the past gives to action 
cannot be reconciled with the present.  
Antigone backgrounds her action against the 
removed past, Creon backgrounds his action 
against the civil strife of the present.  Their 
conflict is in some respects a conflict about 
the senses of time in which one should act: 
does one act with the sense that one’s 
actions are to be measured against the 
standards of the eternal past, or does one act 
in a timely way to save the city? 35  (The 
play intriguingly draws attention to a linking 
conflict between these times, by setting the 
drama in a time of lineage and descent that 
tangles human action with fate and the 
Gods.)   
The point about time that we can glean 
from Hegel’s study of ethical substance is 
that ethical substance foregrounds action 
against a time that is already done, a time of 
the ethos, but this time is incommensurate 
with the time of the self-conscious action of 
the one who acts.  The Greeks are self-
conscious of this conflict, it is the stuff of 
tragedy for them, and also of philosophy and 
politics. Through rational deliberation on 
how a people should live together, the Greek 
tradition dissolves itself, for example, into 
cities that self-consciously constitute their 
own tradition by writing constitutions.  So 
for Hegel the Greeks are not only exemplary 
of ethical substance, but are its culmination, 
since they dissolve ethical substance.  This 
dissolution leads us to culture.  
Culture works to resolve the conflict 
between the time of the individual and the 
time of the ethos by constituting the shared 
time of a cultural epoch, an ethos that we 
have built within time.  The problem of self-
conscious individual action in ethical 
substance shows that what is required is a 
time that senses the past and future as self-
consciously related to the present.  This time 
is to be found in the self-conscious 
connection between past, present and future 
that is central to cultural labour, as analyzed 
by Hegel.36  For example, both faith and 
enlightenment, and culture in general, 
construct a whole world-view in the present, 
and such a world-view intrinsically includes 
a view of the past as an integral genesis 
point of the present, and of the world-view’s 
future as the purpose of that genesis.  
Cultural work takes the form of cultural 
movements that ‘spontaneously’ initiate new 
forms of life that establish past precedent for 
making sense of what we do today, and 
establish a ‘glorious’ future, as if a cultural 
movement through its self-definition pops 
out into the world fully formed.37  
Enlightenment comes on the scene as a 
movement that calls on everyone to become 
enlightened; it has discovered that our past 
is such that we have always possessed the 
capacity for being enlightened, even if we 
did not know it.  As Hegel puts it, the call of 
enlightenment is “be for yourselves what 
you are in yourselves—reasonable.”38  That 
call retrojects a past that becomes the basis 
for enlightenment’s building toward an 
enlightened future.  
The time of cultural action is thus the 
time of a cultural epoch, a time whose past 
is interpreted and determined through the 
ongoing insights and achievements of the 
present.  This stance of culture is perfectly 
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 exemplified and taken to its extreme in the 
French revolution, with its renovation of the 
calendar, and in the rewriting of history 
intrinsic to all cultural revolution.   
This extreme points to an intrinsic 
problem: cultural time is in fact not a 
spontaneous production, it arises from a past 
prior to a cultural movement, which is to say 
that it arises from a confluence of multiple 
times of action; a culture does not pop out 
into the world, it grows out of something 
beyond it.  To give an example, 
enlightenment as a cultural movement does 
not forge itself from nothing.  It forges itself 
by contrast with a specific background.  Its 
claim that we are all in ourselves reasonable 
is not straightforwardly true, for if this were 
so, then there would be no need for 
enlightenment as a movement, and no 
background against which enlightenment 
could stand out as a new movement.  And if 
enlightenment is to explain how there was a 
time when people were unenlightened, or 
explain why it needs to call on people to be 
what they already are, then it must conceive 
enlightenment as a transformation that 
occurs in individual lifetimes, and first 
occurs in those who become the founders of 
the movement.  The revolutionary claim of 
enlightenment, that everything is now 
different for us as a whole, already 
implicates it in a struggle against the 
momentum of multiple life times that are not 
yet enlightened, against a non-enlightened 
cultural past, and against present anti-
enlightenment movements.  The past is not 
simply a past constituted by this present 
culture, and the past is not univocally 
directed toward the future claimed by this 
culture.  The past and future have a 
momentum that stems from the multiple life 
times that compose and precede cultural 
movements.  So another sense of time is 
required. 
As against ethical substance, whose 
time recedes into a past of founding 
ancestors and gods, the time of cultural 
movement is the time of a cultural epoch 
that breaks itself away from the past and 
forges a new connection between past, 
present and future.  But the time of the 
cultural epoch is alien to the individual.  Yet 
we have seen that a cultural epoch does not 
get to define its own time, that culture builds 
itself from the lifetime of individuals. What 
is required is a sense of time that 
interweaves past, present and future within 
the life of an individual (but not, as Hegel’s 
analysis of reason shows, in a way that 
constitutes the sense of time as abstractly 
individual). 
Morality, as Hegel analyzes it, 
demands such a sense of time, one that 
merges the individual and the universal.39  
Morality realizes that action is not 
something that happens spontaneously, it 
requires its linkage to a past and future and 
general background that make sense of 
action as moral.  But ultimately if this past 
and future are to make sense of one’s own 
action, they must in some sense be one’s 
own past and future.  And yet the lesson of 
reason is that in a life well-lived, a life that 
directs itself toward the right thing to do, the 
background of one’s action has its sense in a 
time shared with others.  There are multiple 
conflicts apparent in moral action.  One 
must act, but action is a process that takes 
time, it cannot yet yield its intended result 
when one initiates it, so one must act 
without full comprehension of the future of 
one’s action, and in doing so one necessarily 
draws on one’s past ways of acting, and that 
past cannot be made a background that 
transparently fits one’s present situation, 
precisely since that background is past.  But 
on the other hand, it is precisely one’s past 
that gives sense to one’s act, and one’s act 
has its sense in its future.  As a necessary 
background to one’s present action, past and 
future seem to be unself-conscious moments 
that one cannot grasp in the present, yet they 
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 need to be made self-conscious for one to 
fully make sense of one’s action and act 
appropriately.  The intention to act morally 
thus plunges one into a profound encounter 
with time—with one’s lifetime—but it also 
confronts one with the fact that one’s 
lifetime escapes oneself, that one’s lifetime 
precisely involves a whole lifetime and 
could never be a possession that could be 
grasped all at once with full self-
consciousness.40  The past is done, the 
future is not yet, but on the other hand, both 
past and future are vital here and now as the 
unself-conscious background of action.  
These contradictions seem to be insoluble, 
and they would be if action were something 
purely individual—if action were something 
that one did on one’s own.  (The beautiful 
soul withers away from the time of action 
since it cannot successfully negotiate these 
demands of action as an individual.)41  But 
recall that it is because action inherently 
brings one into an encounter with something 
beyond oneself that one cannot give a purely 
rational sense to the time of action.  To be 
self-conscious is to live by one’s act, and to 
make sense of one’s act as one’s life is to 
make one’s act be responsible to its inherent 
self-consciousness—but the self-
consciousness that would make sense of 
one’s act is not a purely individual self-
consciousness, it is not numerically one.42  
Action is not something individual, and our 
lifetime is a time amidst the lifetimes of 
others.   
Conscience is the position that lives 
this contradiction.  Conscience realizes that 
moral action is properly initiated from one’s 
own lifetime rather than the time of culture 
or the Gods.  One’s conscience is what is 
most singular about oneself as a singular 
moral agent, it is the inner truth of self-
consciousness.  Yet conscience realizes that 
each one has its own conscience, and this 
conscience is expressed in moral action in 
the communal sphere.  To live by 
conscience is to recognize the demand of 
another’s conscience in the action of that 
other.  Conscience as the most internal is for 
that very reason bound to all other 
consciences and the external world of 
conscientious action; and this bind of the 
internal and the external is precisely where 
one’s inner conscience and one’s outer 
action can fall apart in time.  The 
conscientious lifetime does not necessarily 
appear as such when it acts its life in public 
time.  The position of conscience realizes 
that no one self-consciousness can succeed 
in initiating conscientious action from 
within the confines of its own lifetime, even 
if conscientious action must be initiated on 
the basis of the conscientious lifetime.43  
Thus on Hegel’s analysis action from 
conscience can only succeed if it develops 
into the labour of forgiveness, which is the 
self-conscious labour of ‘filling in’ the self-
consciousness background that no one can 
succeed in constituting as an individual.   
Forgiveness precisely requires a 
different sense of time.44  It comprehends 
that each action stems from an unself-
conscious background that must be made 
self-conscious.  Each action thus carries a 
burden of a lifetime, and what gives sense to 
conscience is a lifetime that is an integral 
weave of past, present and future.  Yet no 
one action in a lifetime ever resolves this 
burden, is ever adequate to fully resolving 
the tension between unself-conscious and 
self-conscious moments inherent in any 
action.  Forgiveness tries to fill in the 
comprehension that goes missing in this 
tension, it lends the sense of action that goes 
missing in a lifetime that can never yet have 
resolved its own tensions.  Approached with 
questions of time in mind, forgiveness finds 
the missing sense in action by sensing it in a 
time in which proper action can eventually 
take place, and in which action is to be 
understood against the past and future that a 
whole lifetime is aiming at.  In short, 
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 forgiveness comprehends action as taking 
place in lived time—this is the time in which 
conscience acquires its sense.45  But this 
sense can only be acquired in the mutually 
entwined lived time where forgiveness can 
occur.  One’s own lived time is inadequate 
to making sense of conscientious action, 
what is required is a sense of the shared time 
in which action can work itself out.  And in 
this shared time the non-linear weave 
apparent in the experience of individual 
action is, so to speak, amplified—the time in 
which we can forgive is not merely a past, 
present and future sensed as interwoven in 
the experience of action, it is a time in which 
we must work at being self-conscious of this 
interweaving as the ground of all possible 
action.  Here the sense of time implied as an 
unself-conscious background of all action 
becomes a self-conscious sense of time that 
enables action, and the requisite sense of 
self-consciousness about time is precisely a 
self-consciousness about action as 
necessarily having its background in a 
community and in our histories.46   
At this point we are in a position to 
review what can be gleaned about time from 
Hegel’s study of reason and shapes of 
spiritual life.  Reason claimed that it could 
make full sense of the time in which it acts, 
but the very condition of action is an 
engagement with otherness that ultimately 
implies a different sense of time, a time in 
which one’s actions take one into a temporal 
flow beyond pure reason.  In ethical 
substance, this time beyond reason goes 
back into the time of the ethos, but this 
opens a conflict between the time of 
individual rational action and the time of the 
ethos.  Culture opens a sense of time in 
which past and future are self-consciously 
related to the present, via the labour of 
building a cultural epoch.  But culture does 
not yet give a sense of time that makes sense 
of individual action, since it brings cultural 
epochs and their temporal dimension into 
being by speech and cultural fiat that 
alienate the individual.  Morality takes 
individual action and its conditions as its 
central concern, but this plunges morality 
into the difficulty of providing a unity to 
action within the life of an individual, given 
that action is dispersed in time; for morality, 
however, the unity of the time of action is at 
least to be related to the life of an individual 
moral agent.  Hegel’s analysis implies that 
this unity is never to be achievable in any 
immediate form, since action is never over 
and done with, but rather requires the labour 
of forgiveness which so to speak 
supplements the temporal dispersion into 
which one’s action is plunged.  The sense of 
time that ultimately matters in spiritual life 
is a sense of lived time, of a past, present 
and future woven together in light of one’s 
attempt to act as individual.  But this lived 
time does not belong to one alone, it is made 
sense of in a community.  We can get a 
better sense of this relation between lived 
time and community by briefly turning to 
the role of religion in the Phenomenology. 
Religion begins with an unself-
conscious experience of this claim about the 
implication of our lifetime in the lifetime of 
others.  In religion, the time that makes 
sense of action belongs to a beyond in which 
we are in some way participant.  If one 
follows the ordering of works and days 
integrally and eternally specified by the 
divine order of things, then, religion claims, 
one will be participant in something good.  
Therein lies the way to proper action.  In 
religion, the time of shared devotion brings 
us into a participation in a time whose sense 
is experienced as something outside us—for 
example, there is a God who creates the 
world and the visible order of time, and we 
make sense of our place in that order and 
move beyond the secular time order by 
following the cycle of holy days and 
prayers; to observe a holy day is to 
participate in an ordering whose holiness is 
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 in a time beyond us.  In contrast, in the 
labours of spirit discussed above, there is a 
sense of a time beyond one, but it is 
experienced as stemming from subjectivity 
and the problems of action.  Therein lies the 
contrast between religious time and, for 
example, Antigone’s experience of time: 
Antigone finds that her action recedes into a 
past defined by the Gods, a past that opens 
conflicts in the sense of her own action, 
whereas devotional worship is a way of 
partaking in an eternal sense that is already 
there and that goes beyond one’s own life.   
The point of Hegel’s chapter on 
religion is to show that in fact the external 
aspect of religion, this aspect of an eternal 
beyond in which one partakes, must become 
subjective and move into time.  What is 
encountered as an unself-conscious 
background of ritual life in fact is already a 
self-conscious element of life, and becomes 
ever more self-conscious.  In terms of time, 
this means that the time beyond us in which 
we make sense of life cannot merely be a 
given outside, we must be participant in it.  
For Hegel, this is apparent in revealed 
religion’s claim that God has become man, 
which would also be the claim that the time 
of a beyond in which we are participant is in 
fact the lifetime of a community.  But this 
would also be apparent in any religion in 
which the community comes to focus on 
forgiveness, on mediating the conflicts 
between different orders of time, the time of 
the individual vs. the time of the community 
vs. the time of the eternal.  (I am thinking, 
for example, of Yom Kippur in Judaism, 
which might be translated as “The Day of 
Atonement,” but at the root of the word 
“kippur” are words for washing things away. 
47  Indeed, one of the rituals of the day is 
“tashlich,” casting bits of bread into a river, 
symbolically ridding oneself of sins and bad 
habits.  Rabbis and teachers constantly 
emphasise that the prayers do not just ask 
God to disregard sins committed against 
God, but ask others to disregard the sins, 
slights, and wrong-doings that we have 
committed against them—and the singing of 
these prayers together as a community is a 
central part of the ritual.  So on this holiest 
day of the year, the people’s history with 
God, the yearly cycle of the community, and 
the path of one’s lifetime intersect and 
support one another in the subjectivity of a 
communal ritual that tries to make a fresh 
start with actions on all these levels of time.) 
I would like to take up these general 
points about time and religion by returning 
to Gately.  Gately acknowledges that 
something beyond his rational capacity is 
integral to his reform to the extent that he 
realizes that his own time of action is not 
what enables his reform.  We can see, 
though, that the beyond that supports 
Gately’s attempt to change is not a remote, 
mysterious beyond, in fact it is the ritual 
communal life of A.A.  This community 
unconditionally supports and forgives him in 
his attempt to change, even if Gately does 
not comprehend how what he is doing 
works, that is, even if Gately does not 
comprehend how attempting to change an 
addictive habit can be an act.  Here we have 
to acknowledge that the ritual life of A.A., 
its slogans and meetings, expresses an 
unself-conscious comprehension of how 
attempts to change addictive habits can be 
acts.  A.A. gives Gately the time to change 
and the time in which he can change because 
its activities get Gately to dwell in patterns 
that are alien to his rational attempts at 
change, and thus bring Gately into a ritual.  
This ritual time fills in the gaps that make it 
impossible for Gately to change on his own.  
What A.A. does not do is give a self-
conscious account of how it works, and this 
is what drives Gately bats, and why he has 
to go on faith when it comes to A.A. 
The A.A. life expresses an unself-
conscious comprehension of how attempts 
to change habits can actually act, and 
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 precisely in being unself-conscious this 
comprehension pictures48 the possibility of 
acting as coming from a beyond that is 
common to all members of A.A.  Believe in 
some higher power, whatever it is, perform 
one’s rituals, come to every meeting without 
fail, and one will change, how, A.A. will not 
say.  But if it is in fact the ritual communal 
life that is the mutual beyond that supports 
the action of its members, A.A.’s picture of 
what it is doing does not in fact comprehend 
what it is doing.  The fact that A.A. works is 
not a brute fact about the workings of life or 
the workings of time, it is neither magic nor 
miracle, it is something in which the activity 
of A.A. is participant.  The time of change 
that A.A. enables for its members is a time 
whose sense is maintained by the work of 
A.A. members.  The beyond is in fact 
emergent out of a self-conscious communal 
locale in which members share a sense of 
activity and a sense of a possible time of 
change.  In a way, A.A. knows this, for it 
realizes that it is nothing other than its own 
work of meeting and following ritual; but it 
is not self-conscious about this connection, 
since within A.A., the experience of change 
as ultimately being granted by a beyond is in 
fact requisite to success in changing, given 
that what is being changed has the dire 
weight of an addiction.  If one really needed 
A.A. to drop an addiction, then even if the 
workings of A.A. were explained, even if 
one understood it, one would still have to go 
through the ritual, live each day one day at a 
time within the ritual time of A.A., in order 
to change.  Or at least this is what the novel 
suggests, and it seems convincing, and 
supportable by a phenomenological analysis 
of the dependency intrinsic to any action 
(with the complication that a discussion of 
degrees would be inherent in such an 
analysis) as well as by analyses of 
alcoholism such as Gregory Bateson’s.49  
We are the akratic animal, and since being 
self-conscious of one’s akrasia is precisely 
the condition for akrasia, and not its 
solution, since akrasia thus always confronts 
us in our effort to live our mortal lives well, 
we akratic animals are also inherently the 
ritual spiritual, religious and political 
animal.  
For us mortals the sense of individual 
action demands a self-conscious background 
that is more than individual, and in which 
we are in fact participant.  But sometimes 
that self-conscious background must appear 
as an unself-conscious background of action 
that is given by the grace of something that 
does not demand our full participation—this 
is what religion presents.  What Wallace’s 
novel suggests is that the forms of 
dependency that are endemic to secular life 
in fact demand something cognate to 
religion as Hegel describes it.50  Religion is 
not a practice reducible to forms of worship, 
definite historical forms, and given codes 
(although it is inseparable from them); it is a 
way (among other things) of unself-
consciously participating in a beyond and 
sense of time that enables us to make sense 
of our lives and action, given that our mortal 
lives dissipate in time.  But we are in fact 
implicitly, self-consciously participant in 
this beyond, and this beyond is reciprocally 
participant in the here and now, in the form 
of the communal life of mortal individuals 
who are constituted such that their action is 
always a reciprocal bind between the unself-
conscious and the self-conscious, between 
more habitual and more active poles of 
action.  Religion presents rituals and 
practices that address life in this bind, while 
the life of spirit is the self-conscious 
working out of this bind.  Both aspects show 
that the sense integral to action requires a 
sense of action as occurring in a lived time 
that is something more than individual, a 
time that is in fact the life of the community.   
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  IV: The Time of Absolute Knowing 
The above specifies senses of time implied 
in the shapes of experience that Hegel 
studies.  Having surveyed these senses of 
time, we are in a position to suggest an 
interpretation of Hegel’s claims about time 
in the chapter “Absolute Knowing,”  
especially his remarks about time as the 
intuition of the concept. 
Hegel writes that “Time is the concept 
itself that is there and which presents itself 
to consciousness as empty intuition,” and 
that time “is the outer, intuited pure self 
which is not grasped by the self, the merely 
intuited concept.”51  By “concept” Hegel 
means the ongoing result of the sort of 
spiritual activity discussed above, as a 
living, self-conscious process that works to 
comprehend the network of relations, 
meanings and situations through which such 
spiritual activity elaborates and 
comprehends itself.  From the point of view 
of the above analysis of time, the claim that 
time is the merely intuited concept and that 
time is the concept that is there and which 
presents itself to consciousness as empty 
intuition is the claim that time is the formal 
aspect in which the demand for conceptual 
labour is intuited, yet not comprehended.   
We have seen how particular situations 
that call for self-conscious action throw one 
into an encounter with different senses of 
time, whether it be that of one’s life, that of 
one’s culture, or that of one’s ethos.  One is 
thrown into such an encounter because 
action is inherently something dispersed in 
time, it cannot take place all at once here 
and now, it moves toward a presumed future 
and presumes a starting point that cannot be 
secured now, because now is already too 
late.  Yet past, present and future must be 
integrally implicated in one another if one’s 
action is to be successfully self-conscious.  
As Hegel writes, “spirit necessarily appears 
in time.”  What one encounters in action, 
then, is a need for an unself-conscious 
background that would provide an integral 
weave of past, present and future that would 
enable self-conscious action.  Pure reason 
does not succeed in providing this weave, 
because it cannot get beyond itself into a 
time of action that must already be there for 
reason to be at all; but the various shapes of 
spirit do provide different textures and 
configurations of this weave.  Each such 
weave of time, intuitively encountered 
(especially in the case of action that fails to 
meet the demands of self-consciousness), 
implicitly indicates the concept belonging to 
the corresponding shape of spirit.  In 
encountering a particular weave of time in 
relation to one’s action, one is implicitly 
encountering the concept behind that weave.  
For example, one encounters the concept of 
the ethos in experiencing one’s action as 
bearing the weight of the past of the Gods.  
But to the extent that one is encountering the 
concept via the time-form belonging to it, 
one is not really comprehending the concept 
at all, one is engaged in an intuitive 
encounter with the concept.  When Don 
Gately realizes that he cannot comprehend 
how he is changing, but that he is 
nonetheless changing, he encounters a time-
form that is paradoxical, that presents a 
certain resistance or opacity in relation to his 
self-conscious efforts at action.  This 
intuitive opacity of the time form precisely 
indicates a conceptual underpinning that 
eludes his comprehension, but is nonetheless 
actual—he knows some concept is at work 
but does not know the concept.  He is 
encountering the concept that would enable 
him to make sense of his change (in fact he 
is living that concept via his participation in 
A.A. and his world).  But so far as this 
encounter remains at the intuitive level of 
something that drives him bats, he is not 
comprehending that concept, the concept is 
“there” as “merely intuited.”  This is 
because the intuition in question is “empty” 
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 of anything other than its form.  Don Gately 
is experiencing a peculiar sense of time, and 
just that; this sense of time is correlate with 
his changing self, but he cannot make sense 
of the time in which he senses that change; 
the peculiarity of the change in its merely 
intuitive form is empty of clues as to what is 
at work behind it.  Comprehended from 
another point of view, however, this time-
form, grasped in relation to self-conscious 
action, specifies precisely the concept that 
enables Gately’s change, namely the concept 
embodied in the communal activity of A.A.   
The study of senses of time in the 
previous section lets us see how the concept 
that comprehends itself through the activity 
of spiritual life sediments itself in various 
senses of time implied by each shape of 
spiritual life.  This gives us an important 
ingredient in making sense of the intuited 
time-form as the concept “that is there and 
which presents itself to consciousness as 
empty intuition,” and of time as “the outer, 
intuited pure self which is not grasped by the 
self, the merely intuited concept.”52  It also 
helps make sense of Hegel’s claim that 
given that time is “the concept itself that is 
there and which presents itself to 
consciousness as empty intuition” for this 
reason (deswegen) “spirit necessarily 
appears in time”: if the concept that is there 
presents itself in the form of time, and this 
means that the concept of self-conscious life 
actualizes itself through the sorts of time-
forms discussed above, then there is no way 
for spirit to conceive itself other than in 
time.   
But Hegel’s claims that “spirit 
necessarily appears in time” is qualified with 
the statement that it does so “just so long as 
it has not grasped its pure concept, i.e. has 
not annulled time,” and he also writes that 
when the concept grasps itself “it sublates its 
time-form, comprehends this intuiting [of 
time], and is a comprehended and 
comprehending intuiting.”  This appears to 
many to be the troubling claim that the move 
to philosophical comprehension is a move 
that dispenses with time, that somehow 
Hegel thinks that philosophical 
comprehension brings an ‘end’ to issues of 
time.  But there is an obvious and deep irony 
in the claim that spirit necessarily appears in 
time “so long as [solange]” it has not 
annulled time, and as Flay is careful to point 
out, what is sublated in this annulling is only 
the time-form, not time itself.53  Time is not 
abolished, it acquires a different sense, a 
sense that is no longer bound to the formal 
aspect of our intuition of time, but to the 
concept of which time is the intuitive form.  
We can refer to Gately and A.A. again: the 
sense that Gately makes of his life is a sense 
bound to a time-form (the succession of 
A.M.s and P.M.s, of A.A. meetings and 
activities) that is simply there as the magical 
framework in which he can change, and 
A.A.’s picture for making sense of life is 
likewise bound to a time-form.  But if we 
comprehend how A.A. is in fact a 
community whose labour responds to the 
conceptual demand intrinsic to human action 
and life, which labour in fact generates the 
time-form that enables change (the lifetime 
of the community), then we comprehend 
that the time-form in fact has its integrity in 
a conceptual labour, that the time-form is a 
necessary appearance, but that the necessity 
of the appearance is in the concept that gives 
it integrity.  It is not time itself, formally 
determined as a flow of events, or a 
particular texture of happenings, etc., that 
enables change, but time as the form in 
which the concept is manifest and is there, 
in which the community works out its 
concept and thereby lives a time in which 
change is possible.   
Alternatively, consider the saying 
“time heals.”  There is something true about 
this.  Without one’s being self-consciously 
involved, without one being able to be self-
consciously involved, grief, heartbreak and 
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 trauma may heal.  To the extent that one just 
utters this as a saying, one has not moved 
beyond the formal aspect of time, even if 
one is saying something that one takes to be 
true for all time; for in just saying it one 
takes oneself to be imparting some wisdom 
about a peculiar property or power of the 
time-form.  But if one comprehends why 
time heals, and that it is necessary to 
healing, and that healing is not just a matter 
of waiting out clock ticks but being involved 
in life, if one understands something about 
the very concept of spiritual life that 
necessitates that an experience of a 
particular sense of time be crucial to that 
life, then one’s claim grasps the concept of 
spiritual life and is no longer determined by 
the time-form, even if the claim is still about 
the time-form.  And Hegel’s 
Phenomenology does seem to imply an 
argument that time can heal,54 so in this 
sense if we have grasped its argument about 
the absolute starting point of philosophy in 
comprehension of the concept, then we have 
put aside the time-form in grasping once and 
for all that the spiritual role of the time-form 
is in the conceptual labour that it enables 
and manifests.  With respect to spiritual life, 
time is to be comprehended in terms of the 
integrity of self-conscious living action, not 
as a form of succession.  To put it in terms 
of later phenomenology, time as it is lived 
does not get its sense from the succession of 
moments, but from an inner integrity that 
arises from within, in an ecstatic structuring 
that is integral with life and its sense.  
But this integrity of self-conscious 
living action ultimately achieves its sense in 
the conceptual situation of a community.  
The concept is never individual, it is never a 
concept, it is the concept that works across 
self-conscious individuals and communities 
through their interrelations.  The concept 
places itself in the situation and history from 
which it arises.  To say that spirit necessarily 
appears in time “so long as” it has not 
grasped its concept is to say that spirit’s 
grasp of its concept is something that arises 
in time; and above I have argued that when 
it grasps its concept spirit does not discard 
time, but comprehends the time-form as 
manifesting the concept that is still at work 
in the life of community.  Such 
comprehension of time precisely requires 
the conceptual labour of analysing the 
community through its history and 
situation—and this is not a matter of 
gathering empirical data, rather it is a matter 
of comprehending how the community 
comprehends itself through its history and 
situation.  In this sense the time-form is 
annulled, since comprehension arises in the 
time of self-interpretation, with its 
hermeneutic circles, etc.; and yet 
comprehension is precisely situated within 
the community, within the interpretative 
dimensions through which the community 
makes sense of itself and its place.   
When Hegel writes that spirit sublates 
its time-form when it comprehends its 
concept, this is far from the claim that spirit 
makes an exit from time into some beyond.  
On the contrary, spirit enters into 
comprehension of its place in the world.  
The time-form is sublated because first of all 
something far more robust, something like 
place—not time on its own, but time and 
space as integrally woven and embedded in 
each other within a rooted history—is 
requisite to making sense of spiritual life.  
This is powerfully suggested by Flay’s 
remarks about place in his article.  But place 
and the sense of time that arises in place 
must be grasped in terms of their conceptual 
articulation.  On the one hand, this is the 
argument that lived time is inherently 
emplaced in the community, in the situation 
and living framework of interpretation that 
lets us make sense of lived time; on the 
other hand, this is the argument that place is 
not an immediate phenomenon, but nurtured 
by a conceptual labour that gives place a 
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 sense.  In this way Hegel’s study of shapes 
of experience, and the implications of this 
study regarding senses of time, and the 
relation between these senses and the sense 
of place and concept, open into the 
discussion of lived time and place that are 
currently underway.55
We are mortal, our days are numbered.  
But our days are to be numbered as those of 
a life well-lived, as a life whose sense can be 
comprehended before its number has turned 
up.  To do this we need a sense of time as 
not merely a succession of works and days, 
but as a comprehensive framework for 
making sense of one’s life.  This 
comprehensive framework is not granted by 
any moment to moment formal progression 
of time-events, by the ticking of the clock, it 
is granted by conceptual activity that makes 
sense of that framework within its place.  
The numbering of our days, then, cannot 
begin or stop with the days of one’s own 
life, it needs to be imbricated in a place and 
its history, and the demand of this 
imbrication is ever more comprehensive; to 
comprehend one’s lifetime, one must 
conceive it in the universally comprehensive 
setting that enables it, and to do that a “one” 
is insufficient, rather a “we” conceived of 
such “ones” must bring the universal back 
into the place from which it is conceived.  
The attempt to justly number the days of 
one’s mortal life, which attempt is 
demanded in every moment of a life which 
as mortal would escape one in time and in 
akratic action that runs away from one, is 
the absolute responsibility of 
comprehending this relation wherein we in 
our place and history interweave with the 
universal.56  To comprehend this relation is 
perhaps to write a poem such as William 
Carlos Williams’s Paterson57, which turns 
from life as “Rolling up, rolling up heavy 
with/ numbers”, “so that never in this/ world 
will a man live well in his body/ save 
dying—and not know himself/ dying”, to 
“shells and animalcules/ generally and so to 
man,/ to Paterson,” that is, to human life and 
identity as one with the place of a city and 
its history:   
For the beginning is assuredly 
the end—since we know nothing, pure 
and simple, beyond 
our own complexities. 
 
   Yet there is 
no return: rolling up out of chaos, 
a nine months’ wonder, the city 
the man, an identity—it can’t be 
otherwise—an 
interpenetration, both ways.  Rolling 
up! obverse, reverse; 
the drunk the sober; the illustrious 
the gross; one.  In ignorance 
a certain knowledge and knowledge, 
undispersed, its own undoing. 
 
 
                                                          
1 Cf. Aristotle’s discussion of Solon’s 
paradox in the Nicomachean Ethics, I·10. 
2 See especially Heidegger’s Being and Time 
(trans. John Macquarrie and Edward 
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Phenomenology of Reason and Dualism,” 
The Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 
(1993): 71-96.  I return to these issues 
below. 
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81-86.  
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through which self-consciousness can show 
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discussion, the point of Hegel’s analysis is 
that the dialectic of the changeable and the 
unchangeable through which the unhappy 
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propelled self-consciousness to the point of 
unhappiness.  The restlessness of unhappy 
consciousness is impacted in this dialectic 
whereby consciousness tries to escape the 
very possibility of moving. 
18 PdG 158-159, M233. 
19 That time is a topic integral to reason is 
quite apparent in Hegel’s analysis of 
observing reason.  He argues that observing 
reason is compelled toward observation of 
organic phenomena, and reason’s claim that 
it can observe a reality that is rationally 
ordered is more adequately supported by 
such phenomena, in virtue of their 
temporally self-ordering process, which 
exhibits the sorts of structure belonging to 
reason itself.  For example, he writes: “in 
existence in its structured shape, observation 
can encounter reason only as life in 
general.” (PdG 199, M295)  The further 
point of this paragraph, however, is that the 
rationally adequate form of the sort of 
existence that reason observes in “life in 
general” is in fact to be found in world 
history.  Time figures as an issue graspable 
by reason, but ultimately it will figure as the 
time in which reason itself unfolds, which 
means that reason will not be able to claim 
an immediate grasp of time, time will have 
to happen in concert with the world in which 
reason is situated.  
20 That reason must concern itself not only 
with observing the world but with its own 
practice and thence with rational action in 
general is the point of Hegel’s transition 
from V.A “Observing Reason” to V.B “The 
Actualization of Rational Self-
Consciousness through Itself,” and is 
summarized in the claim that the category, 
the unity of being and self claimed by 
reason’s certainty that it is all reality, which, 
“in the course of observation has run 
through the form of being,” is now “posited 
in the form of being-for-self: consciousness 
no longer aims to find itself immediately, 
but to produce itself by its own activity.” 
(PdG 231, M344).  Also see note 4 above.  
That this self-actualization requires attention 
to an unself-conscious background that is 
not absorbable into pure reason will be taken 
up in what follows, and is also the point of 
Hegel’s argument that ethical substance and 
spirit are vital to the project of reason.   
21 David Foster Wallace, Infinite Jest 
(Boston: Back Bay Books/Little, Brown and 
Company, 1996), 466. 
22 Infinite Jest, p 443.   
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23 See book II, chapter 4, esp. 1105a15-
1105b5. 
24 Infinite Jest, p 468.   
25 Also see the note to this sentence (note 90, 
pp 1000-1003—yes, this is a novel that has 
endnotes) which records a conversation 
between Gately and Day.  In terms of the 
discussion that follows, the point here would 
be that for its members, AA operates on the 
level of Vorstellungen, not on the level of 
Begriff. 
26 On the problem with this sort of 
rational claim, and why reason depends on a 
community and history beyond reason, see 
page 7 and notes 4 and 19 above. 
Particularly helpful on this issue are Jean 
Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit; John Russon, 
“Hegel’s Phenomenology of Reason and 
Dualism”; Joseph Flay’s Hegel’s Quest for 
Certainty.  In this context, Gregory 
Bateson’s analysis of A.A. (“The 
Cybernetics of “Self”: A Theory of 
Alcoholism,” in Steps to an Ecology of Mind 
[New York: Ballantine Books, 1972, 309-
337], 322)  is also relevant.  Bateson’s point 
is that conceiving alcoholism along 
Cartesian, rationalist lines.  Alcoholics who 
operate in this way continually relapse; they 
have to drink in order to demonstrate that 
they are in rational control and do not need 
to drink.  The virtue of A.A., according to 
Bateson, is that it realizes that a ritual or 
religious framework is requred to exit this 
Cartesian, rationalist bind.  
27 See note 20. This point about time being a 
residuum beyond reason would seem to be 
suggested by Kant’s antinomies.   
28 Cf. Hyppolite’s point, via Nicolai 
Hartmann, that one of the signal features of 
Hegel’s discussion of reason is to show that 
idealism is not a philosophical thesis, but a 
phenomenon of spirit. (Genesis and 
Structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology of 
Spirit, 226)  On the point that our life is 
something beyond the ambit of reason, also 
see the point from Bateson about alcoholism 
in note 26 above. 
29 Cf. the point summarized, e.g., in PdG 
233-235 M348-350, that individual reason 
must become universal reason, that the 
concept of universal reason is found in 
ethical life, and that ethical life is actual in 
the sphere of custom—that the life of reason 
is found in the life of a people.  In the 
broader context of the Phenomenology this 
would be the point that reason cannot 
comprehend itself through some pure 
intuition of time, it comprehends itself 
through the time of custom.  Such a time is a 
condition of rationality: if the reason aimed 
at by idealism appears as a phenomenon of 
spirit (see note 28), so too does its time. 
30 On this sense of “magic” also see 
Collingwood’s Principles of Art (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1958), chapter IV. 
31 The argument that rational action depends 
on substance and that this is first of all to be 
found in ethical substance is given in the 
final portions of chapter V of PdG, and the 
point is also made in the introductory 
portion of V.B; this is also why the analysis 
of spirit begins with the discussion of 
Sittlichkeit, of ethos as a substance.  For a 
discussion of the relation between Sitte and 
habit, see McCumber’s “Hegel on Habit”; 
and see Russon’s The Self and its Body in 
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. 
32 See R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of 
History (London: Oxford University Press, 
1956), esp. the introduction. 
33 See Hegel’s point at the end of the chapter 
on reason (in which he is securing the 
transition to ethical substance) that the 
relationship of self-consciousness and its 
essence is now one in which: “They [the 
25 
                                                                                                                                                                               
essences] are and nothing more; this is what 
constitutes the awareness of its relationship 
to them.  Thus, Sophocles’ Antigone 
acknowledges them as the unwritten and 
infallible law of the gods.  “They are not of 
yesterday or today, but everlasting,/ Though 
where they came from, none of us can tell.”” 
(PdG 286, M437).  What is essential to 
rational, ethical life is referred to the past.  
This is reflected in Hegel’s later division of 
the ethical world into this world and a 
beyond, governed respectively by human 
law and divine law, where the divine law is 
“everlasting.” (Cf. PdG 291, M443)  It is 
notable that Hegel’s discussion of the 
division between divine and human law is 
implicated in a discussion of relations 
between generations across familial time, 
where the family is the unconscious 
(bewußtlose) concept (PdG 294, M450). (Cf. 
V.A.a, esp. PdG 298-300, M456-457)  If the 
human law in the form of the government 
“has from time to time to shake them [the 
families] to their core by war” (PdG 298, 
M455), this is precisely because the family 
and the divine law with which it is affiliated 
goes back into a very different time, a time 
beyond the “from time to time” of the 
government. 
34 PdG VI.A.b. 
35 Cf. the point that “For the commands of 
government have a universal, public 
meaning open to the light of day; the will of 
the other law, however, is locked up in the 
darkness of the nether regions” (PdG 306, 
M466), which description is taken up at PdG 
312-313, M474, in the discussion of what 
Antigone’s action unleashes as a conflict 
between self-conscious spirit and what is 
unconscious.  It is this time going back into 
the ethos, a time before time, that indicates 
an unself-conscious background that is 
merely over against the self-conscious time 
of human law.  Neither sorts of time are 
adequate to the actual time of human action, 
a time in which we have to educate 
ourselves individually and culturally into a 
sense of how to act. 
36 PdG VI.B. 
37 See, for example, Hegel’s emphasis on 
language throughout the chapter on culture, 
e.g., “In the world of ethical order, in law 
and command, and in the actual world, in 
counsel only, language has the essence for 
its content and is the form of that content; 
but here it has for content the form itself, the 
form which language itself is, and is 
authoritative as language.  It is the power of 
speech, as that which performs what has to 
be performed.” (PdG 335, M508)  Whereas 
the activity of the ethical order goes back 
into its precedent, speech as the activity that 
is performative of culture is its own 
precedent.  This is the sense in which 
culture comprehensively creates the entire 
context for its own build-up, an entire 
approach to spiritual life.  When pure insight 
“calls to every consciousness: be for 
yourselves what you all are in yourselves—
reasonable” (PdG 355, M537), it is not 
trying to directly act upon others, but to 
provide a language which calls upon each 
consciousness to convert itself, and this 
means converting itself to the whole world 
view which would make sense of that 
conversion.  Pure insight, however, splits 
into an internal battle between faith and 
enlightenment and it is here where culture 
becomes a movement against itself and an 
effort to define that world-view in which our 
mutual language makes sense of ourselves 
as reasonable. 
38 PdG 355, M537.  
39 PdG VI.C.   
40 Cf. the quotation given in note 43. 
41 These points become apparent in Hegel’s 
articulation of the moral world view as in 
conflict with nature and as needing to 
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harmonize nature with moral consciousness, 
which leads to a division between pure duty 
and thought, and thence to dissemblance and 
duplicity and to the problems of conscience.  
(PdG 395-415, M599-631)  In all these 
cases a fundamental problem is how actions 
determined from within consciousness can 
take place in natural actuality as the sort of 
actions that they need to be, and one of the 
factors contributing to this problem is the 
temporal extendedness of an action and its 
rootedness in the past. 
42 Cf. the way that morality brings in 
“another consciousness” a “thought” 
“postulated beyond reality” (PdG 401-402, 
M606-609) to achieve the harmony of moral 
consciousness and nature, and how this 
harmony is later brought about by 
conscience that supersedes the division of 
moral consciousness and nature (PdG 417, 
M634)—but conscience requires another 
conscience that would recognize it and 
forgive failures in action. 
43 Cf., e.g., the claim that conscience knows 
that the reality of action “is a plurality of 
circumstances which breaks up and spreads 
out endlessly in all directions, backwards 
into their conditions, sideways into their 
connections, forwards in their consequences.  
The conscientious mind is aware of this 
nature of the thing and of its relation to it, 
and knows that, in the case in which it acts, 
it does not possess that full acquaintance 
with all the attendant circumstances which is 
required, and that its pretence of 
conscientiously weighing all circumstances 
is vain.  However, this acquaintance with, 
and weighing of, all the circumstances are 
not something altogether lacking; but they 
exist only as a moment, a something which 
is only for others; and this incomplete 
knowledge is held by the conscientious mind 
to be sufficient and complete, because it is 
its own knowledge.” (PdG 422, M642)  
Given the weave that goes into action—and 
this weave goes across time—it is in vain to 
presume that we are ever in a position to act 
in a way absolutely conformable to 
conscience.  To do so, we could say, would 
require going over one’s whole life time, 
past and future to come, in each moment, a 
multiply impossible duplication of one’s 
life.  But the fact that we know this, and 
know this in our relation to others, gives us a 
way of negotiating this problem, namely in 
forgiveness.  
44 My claims here about the sense of time 
proper to forgiveness are very much 
influenced by H.S.  Harris’s analysis of the 
“syllogism” of morality and forgiveness, in 
Hegel’s Ladder II: The Odyssey of Spirit 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997), 
457-508; and this influences the 
understanding of Hegel on morality that is 
behind my claim about the sense of time 
belonging to morality. 
45 If culture enters a new sense of time by 
taking up language as a performative 
dimension of culture (see note 37) 
conscience is spirit that, in virtue of its 
community, exists through the word in 
which it can immediately perform its own 
conscientiousness in language.  “Here again, 
then, we see language as the existence of 
Spirit.  Language is self-consciousness 
existing for others.”  But here as opposed to 
the ethical and the moral, “The content of 
the language of conscience is the self that 
know itself as essential being.  This alone is 
what it declares, and this declaration is the 
true actuality of the act, and the validating of 
the action.” (PdG 428-29, M652-653)  
Cultural speech performs a cultural epoch, 
whereas conscientious speech performs 
conscience, and also thereby specifies the 
lifetime that one aims to live, whether one 
achieves it or not.  So conscientious speech 
always makes sense of action as belonging 
to the conscientious lifetime which at every 
moment is developing in one’s life, and 
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encompassing one’s lifetime as a whole.  
The connection between language and time 
in the Phenomenology may in fact be 
profound.  
46 This would be the time achieved in the 
“reconciling Yea, in which the two ‘I’s let 
go their antithetical existence” (PdG 442, 
M671). 
47 This is apparent in the use and 
connotations of the word around the day; 
also see the entries in The New Brown-
Driver-Briggs-Gesenius Hebrew and 
English Lexicon, by Francis Brown 
(Lafayette, Indiana: Associated Publishers 
and Authors, 1980), p 497.  
48 I am here trying to capture the sense of 
Hegel’s identification of the use of 
Vorstellung (“picturing” or “picture-
thinking” in the Miller translation) as the 
insufficiency of religion. 
49 Bateson’s point in “The Cybernetics of 
“Self”: A Theory of Alcoholism” is that a 
Cartesian split between self and world is 
fundamental to the alcoholic’s conception of 
the task of escaping alcoholism, but that this 
conception is false.  A.A. is significant in 
realizing this in its first and second steps 
which acknowledge that the self is 
powerless over its relation to alcohol and 
that belief in a higher power is requisite.  In 
other words, A.A. substitutes a theological 
world view for the Cartesian world view, 
thus enabling ‘reform,’ and acts as the 
religious community that supports the 
theological world view.   
50 Cf. Bateson’s point that A.A. is to be 
understood in terms of religion and that this 
religious element is fundamental to A.A.’s 
success (note 49 above).  On these points 
about addiction, ritual and community, also 
see Bruce Wilshire, Wild Hunger: The 
Primal Roots of Modern Addiction 
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), esp. 
chapter six and seven. 
51 This translation and all of the following 
quotes from Hegel are adapted from Miller’s 
translation in PS paragraph 801; PdG 524-
525.   
52 It seems to me that this interpretation of 
time, which works toward the concept from 
the problem of self-conscious spiritual 
action would also have to be taken up at the 
level of religion, in which case the time-
form in question might be something like 
religion’s picture of spiritual time as a 
whole, which Hegel discusses at PdG 446, 
M679. 
53 Flay, “Time in Hegel’s Phenomenology of 
Spirit,” 268. 
54 Cf. PdG 440, M669. 
55 See especially Edward S. Casey’s Getting 
Back into Place: Toward a Renewed 
Understanding of the Place-World 
(Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana UP, 1993) 
and The Fate of Place: A Philosophical 
History (Berkeley: U of California P, 1997).  
Casey’s claims about place in Hegel are in a 
noticeable tension.  This paper’s claims 
about place in Hegel are inspired by the 
questions that this tension raises. 
56 For discussions of this relation, and on the 
interrelation of the “I”, the “we,” the 
universal, the local and responsibility, see 
John Russon, “Selfhood, Conscience and 
Dialectic in Hegel’s Phenomenology of 
Spirit,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 
(1991), 533-550; Russon’s The Self and its 
Body in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit; 
and H.S. Harris, Hegel’s Ladder I & II.  
57 (New York: New Directions, 1968).  All 
quotes are from the “Preface.”  
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